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The experience of financial markets in the global economy is open to a variety of 
interpretations, based on different framings, with important consequences for economic 
policy. Knowledge about financial markets, and the methodology employed to build it, 
can be understood in terms of framing. The underlying argument of the paper is in favour 
of considering the framing financial markets within an open-system approach, allowing 
input from other disciplines, as well as taking account of the real, often performative, 
implications of (closed-system) mainstream framing by policy-makers. The 
methodological underpinnings of, and interdependencies between, different framings 
among theorists, policy-makers, market players and users is explored. 
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1 Introduction 
Global political economy in the area of finance is rarely tranquil. But there is currently 
(in late 2007) an unusual degree of anxiety about sources of turbulence: notably what are 
perceived as the weakness of the primary international form of money (the US dollar), 
structural payments imbalances, the scope for contagion from the subprime mortgage 
collapse in the US to other financial systems, and the interdependence between the 
monetary policy actions to address it. But this situation is open to a variety of 
interpretations, and thus to a variety of policy responses. This paper is concerned with the 
origins of these interpretations, namely the way in which knowledge about financial 
markets is variously construed and constructed, and the role that different understandings 
play in theory policy and practice. We approach this through the concept of ‘framing’, as 
something which is interdependent with how reality is understood on the one hand, and 
methodology on the other.  
 
Following a reflection on the meaning of framing, we start by considering the way in 
which mainstream economists frame financial markets. The way in which meaning is 
attached to concepts and terms, in which the objects of study’s frames are represented, 
and in which questions are posed and answered, depends on the methodology employed. 
We explore the positivist methodology which is employed in mainstream economics in 
order to understand how financial markets are framed for analysis. The new behavioural 
finance is considered as a case study of how this methodology has been adapted in order 
to change the frame (allowing for a change in the way in which agents frame their 
choices), but nevertheless retain its essential elements. This follows from the central 
framing concept of rationality. The old behavioural economics approach is then 
considered, drawing on very different, case study, evidence which includes evidence on 
framing by households and businesses. 
 
International organisations and national monetary policy makers and regulators 
increasingly draw on this academic literature in order to formulate policy with respect to 
financial markets. However the policy tool of manipulating expectations poses a 
reflexivity issue, whereby the authorities attempt to provide the frame for financial 
markets. Further, international organisations who also employ this literature set policy 
agendas for national governments (such as structural adjustment programmes) which 
encourage national governments to adopt the same framing (if only to reap the advantage 
of meeting conditions for lending, for example). We consider the different framing of 
financial markets by the authorities in the following section. 
 
The players in financial markets in turn frame these markets in a yet different way, 
discussed in the fourth section, requiring even more attention to the market process itself, 
rather than simply prices. The analysis of this framing involves recourse to sociology and 
rhetoric as well as psychology. Framing in financial markets themselves is considered in 
the sixth section. These market players can be distinguished from market users. First, 
governments themselves use international capital markets for placing reserves; even in 
the post-Bretton Woods era, with generalised exchange rate floating, these can be 
substantial, and particularly so in the current climate of structural payments imbalances 
and limitations on floating (as with the Renminbi). For those countries facing structural 
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deficits, international capital markets are a potential source of finance; limits on credit 
availability, and/or the need to accept IMF conditionality, has real consequences for the 
domestic economy.  
 
We conclude by reviewing this discussion in relation to the framing by different groups, 
and the methodological issues involved in theoretical framing in relation to framing in the 
economy, as a means of understanding the issues surrounding global financial markets. 
 
2 Framing 
The general meaning of the term ‘framing’ refers to the way in which something is 
presented and thus perceived. In discourse analysis it refers more specifically to what is 
included and what is excluded; discourse analysis is concerned with the interplay 
between different framings. The concept therefore fits well with an analysis of economics 
and the economy in terms of open and closed systems. A closed system is one where 
what is included and what excluded is predetermined, and has fixed meaning. A system is 
open if it fails to satisfy any one of the conditions for a closed system (Chick and Dow 
2005). An open system is not a complete free-for-all – otherwise it would not be a 
system. Arguably reality is completely open at the ontological level, but there is no scope 
for accessing this reality without some framing. Rather, some boundaries are required to 
frame knowledge; but in an open system these boundaries (or frames) are provisional and 
permeable (ie they can evolve, and are not absolute). As soon as we conceptualise 
experience, and even more as soon as we employ words and ascribe them meaning in 
relation to concepts and experience, we are invoking some frame or other. 
 
Framing is a necessary feature of discourse and, in turn is generated and transmitted by 
discourse. Reality is also framed in another sense, by the institutional arrangements, 
conventions and habits which put some (normally provisional, permeable) boundaries 
around the scope for acting on knowledge. Indeed there is scope for interdependence 
between framing at the level of society (or groups within society), and the framing 
embodied in social arrangements, ie social framing. Indeed in social arrangements, and 
even more clearly in the political arena (as in governance of the international financial 
system), which framing dominates is a result of power relations. Thus framing in general 
is not a matter of individual choice. At a deep level for the individual, we frame our 
understanding of the world on the basis of what Searle (1995, 1999) calls background, of 
which we are largely unconscious. Framing further depends on our role in society (and 
thus on power relations). This role takes on a special character for theorising. Different 
disciplines frame the subject matter in their own characteristic ways for example. But 
even within disciplines there can be framing differences, ranging from differences in 
meaning of terms to differences, through theoretical differences, to differences in policy 
recommendations. As we will see, this involves differences in meaning of key terms, 
such as ‘rationality’ and ‘social’. 
 
In economics, the usual application of the framing concept is to the presentation of 
rational choice problems, and has been applied particularly to financial markets within 
the new behavioural finance, following the lead of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). But 
the term has a wider application to questions of knowledge more generally, and thus to 
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the knowledge of analysts as well as the analysed. This is the more common use of the 
term in sociology. Indeed there is scope for different framings on the part of analysts and 
those who are analysed. We will consider these different framings in the context of 
financial markets, but the discussion could be applied similarly to other areas.  
 
3 The Mainstream Economics Frame 
The traditional mainstream way of framing an object of analysis in economics is in terms 
of a set of facts against which theories arrived at deductively can be tested. Because of 
the emphasis on exchange, in financial markets, the core facts are prices (of financial 
assets), and the price of borrowing and lending money (interest rates). Pricing is 
understood as factoring in expectations of risk, measured by past deviations in prices. 
While risk includes default risk (as well as risk of variance in asset prices), this used to be 
the concern primarily for bank loans. Recently, with the growth in credit derivatives, 
concern about default risk has become a significant factor for securities markets. The 
pricing of these derivatives, and the structured products consisting of bundles of tranches 
of securitised loans, thus embodies a probabilistic expectation of default risk, often on the 
basis of credit ratings by ratings agencies. 
 
International financial markets provide a common basis for pricing international assets, to 
render international data commensurate. A critical element is the role of currencies in 
such pricing, and in particular the role of vehicle currencies (the US dollar, the euro, 
sterling, yen) in performing the unit of account and means of payment functions of 
international money. But international money also must perform the store of value 
function; when the key vehicle currency, the US dollar, falls in value, with good reason to 
expect further falls, alternative vehicle currencies become more attractive. Yet, since 
what is used as international money is a matter of socio-political convention, founded on 
confidence, it requires a jolt to confidence for that convention to be challenged. While the 
current weakness of the dollar creates uncertainty, it still performs an important function 
in the pricing of international assets. Yet in the current situation, the ‘facts’ of market 
value in terms of international currencies, as well as the pricing of risk, have lost their 
transparency and solidity.  
 
It is a central role for international organisations to collate the ‘facts’ of international 
finance. Thus the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) collects data on international 
capital flows. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) collects data on such financial 
variables as the money supply and interest rates. The aim is to provide comparable data 
series for all IMF members. The data series present the facts on which policy analysis is 
based. 
 
This method of framing follows from logical positivism, which has been the underlying 
methodological influence on mainstream economics. Methodology is rarely discussed 
explicitly. Yet it plays a powerful role in defining economics, as far as mainstream 
economics is concerned. Logical positivism requires that scientific statements must be 
testable against facts (in principle, if not in practice), and the conventional judgement 
(again rarely discussed) is that only mathematical statements are precise enough for 
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robust testing. So the framing of mainstream economics in general has become one of 
formal mathematical representation.  
 
Theories (such as the McKinnon-Shaw justification for financial liberalisation policies) 
are derived from the axioms of rational individual behaviour, which presume that agents 
are utility maximisers; in financial markets this is taken to mean profit maximisers 
(subject to given preferences with respect to taking on or avoiding risk). Rationality is 
given formal meaning by the axioms (complete preferences, for example, where 
preferences themselves are framed in a particular way). The framework has traditionally 
presumed perfectly competitive markets (although, as we shall see, a limited form of 
market imperfection is now also analysed). This is particularly appealing since it makes 
the required mathematical representation more tractable. And financial markets have 
generally been regarded as the markets which come closest to the idealised perfectly 
competitive market. These markets are normally highly active, information flows are 
good, and the profitability of arbitrage ensures that mispricing is arbitraged away. 
Reforms to create such markets where they do not exist in emerging market economies is 
a key plank of IMF and World Bank policy (de la Torre et al, 2007). 
 
Equilibrium plays a central role in mainstream analysis (again framed in a particular, 
formal, way); Weintraub (1985) notes it as a Lakatosian positive heuristic to conduct 
analysis in terms of equilibrium. Thus a core model is the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), which demonstrates how arbitrage between financial assets (as perfect 
substitutes) drives all asset prices to their equilibrium level (taking account of 
probabilistic risk and return). But it imbues the analysis more fully in focusing attention 
on equilibrium as the expected end-state of market processes. Thus for example, the 
current market turbulence is seen as a ‘correction’ back to equilibrium (given some 
market distortions which had created a disequilibrium).  
 
The notion of ‘facts’ also is normally taken to be unproblematic given the huge sets of 
price and trading data. Much of finance theory developed without reference to data. But 
the profit potential from using finance models to predict market prices has encouraged a 
huge growth of empirical financial analysis, exemplified by the Nobel award winning 
work of Merton and Scholes (and Black), which was actually used in practice in LTCM. 
A further impetus has been provided by the Basel II framework which encourages 
financial institutions to model, and quantify, their own risk profile. This development has 
privileged prediction over explanation in appraising theories. Following Friedman 
(1953), if predictive success is the primary goal of theory, then the content of the theory, 
and in particular the realism of assumptions, is of secondary importance. A particular 
consequence was a justification for treating economic behaviour (expressed in terms of 
rational economic man) as separable from other aspects of behaviour. But given the 
conflicting desires to build theory on realistic assumptions, for theory to be formally 
internally consistent, and the difficulty of separating out actual economic behaviour from 
non-economic behaviour when examining evidence, a divide has built up, as elsewhere in 
economics, between applied work judged by predictive success on the one hand, and pure 
theory judged by internal consistency (given the rationality axioms) on the other. Neither 
in practice can be consistent with logical positivism (ignoring the deductive process or 
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empirical testing, respectively). But the way in which financial markets are analysed 
employs essentially the same general frame. Further, since pure theory is abstract and not 
directly tested, and since applied work either adopts this theory or purports to avoid 
theory (letting ‘the data speak for themselves’) framing issues are not thought to arise. 
 
But the mainstream frame has itself evolved from the 1980s to take on board a much 
wider range of evidence than was previously the case. Thus for example the New 
Keynesian approach (sparked off by Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) takes on board the idea 
(derived from experience) that financial assets are not all perfect substitutes; in particular, 
SMEs have limited access to capital markets and are therefore potentially constrained by 
lack of availability of bank finance. The analysis focuses on a particular way of framing 
credit allocation under asymmetric information. However, while the resulting theory was 
prompted by a real-world problem which had been ruled out by the perfect 
substitutability assumption, and by a new way of framing bank behaviour, the actual 
theory development conforms to the mainstream approach in the framing of the problem 
and seeing banks’ framing in relation to the benchmark of abstract rational fully-informed 
behaviour, with a focus on equilibrium. The source of the problem is identified as 
asymmetric information as to default risk, ie a market imperfection which produces a 
sub-optimal equilibrium outcome of credit rationing. The rationality axioms remain intact 
(extended to rational expectations, except in the one area of default risk on the part of 
individual borrowers), and the empirical testing is done by simulations rather than by 
‘real’ data.  Stiglitz (2002a) puts forward his general approach of focusing on information 
problems as an alternative paradigm to what he calls the ‘competitive paradigm’. The 
account of the framing in terms of information issues draws explicitly on a realist 
comparison with abstract mainstream theory, and incorporates real time in the form of 
hysteresis. Nevertheless the theoretical outcome is constrained by its formalist, 
equilibrium-focused, expression, with the ‘competitive paradigm’ as benchmark. 
 
Stiglitz, in accord with the new institutional economics (to be distinguished from ‘old 
institutional economics’, see Hodgson 1998) has encouraged the consideration of 
governance issues, in particular to consider potential problems of asymmetric information 
between sovereign borrowers and international financial markets. Thus the consensus 
reached in the IMF-based analysis of the South-East Asia crisis of 1997 was that the 
cause had been concealment by South-East Asian governments of the underdeveloped 
governance in their economies, and in particular their banks (see for example Stiglitz’s, 
2002b, critique). Had there been sufficient transparency (and thus perfect knowledge of 
‘the facts’), the capital inflows would not have occurred in such volumes in the first 
place. But IMF thinking has moved further towards the Stiglitz position to incorporate 
also the view that governments, and their governance, should be an element in structural 
adjustment. The Washington Consensus has evolved, such that good governance is now 
understood to be a necessary condition for the successful operation of free markets. This 
has extended the apparent purview of economics, but otherwise appears to leave the 
nature of the mainstream approach to the subject intact, albeit with a new interest in 
information asymmetry in competitive markets.    
 
4 Inputs from Psychology: Behavioural Finance 
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It was not always the case, but mainstream economics evolved to be a ‘separate’ science 
(Hausman 1992), such that rational optimising behaviour applied to market behaviour, 
while other motivations and practices are relevant to non-economic behaviour. Indeed 
other disciplines supported this divide by focusing on non-market behaviour, including 
the behaviour of governments themselves. But in the last few decades, not only have 
economists focused increasing attention, in public choice theory, to public sector (non-
market) behaviour (a tendency employed, as noted above, in the change in IMF analysis), 
but also psychologists and sociologists in particular have been studying market behaviour 
and have influenced economic analysis of market behaviour. This was appealing in 
offering what was seen as greater realism, it offered new explanations for apparent 
anomalies with the standard subjective expected utility (SEU) approach to rational 
behaviour, and it offered solutions to the sticking point of multiple equilibria arrived at in 
areas such as evolutionary game theory and rational expectations theory (Sent 2004). 
 
Thus another type of evidence, derived from experiments and drawing on psychology, 
opened up yet another fruitful line of enquiry, known now as behavioural economics. We 
refer to it here as the ‘new behavioural economics’ to distinguish it from the different 
pre-existing approach of the same name (Sent 2004; Earl 1988, 2005; the differences 
parallel those between new and old institutional economics). The laboratory evidence 
attracted attention because it seemed to contradict the rationality axioms, ie it seemed to 
strike at the core of the mainstream frame. Kahnemann and Tversky (1974, 1979) have 
drawn on the field of psychology to suggest that agents are not rational in the way that is 
assumed by the SEU approach, introducing heuristics and biases in the exercise of 
judgement where cognition is limited (or rationality bounded). In particular, they 
demonstrated that agents choose according to how a question is (psychologically) framed. 
Choice is then not a matter of simple classical logic, but brings with it the preconceptions 
and preferences of the chooser, apparently generating ‘irrational’ choices. The psychic 
frame of the chooser is by implication different from the (rational) frame of the analyst, 
and the analysis of this framing starts from psychology.  
 
While there is reference in behavioural economics to social framing, as in the 
conditioning of choice by social norms, there is little exploration of how it arises, 
although sociology might well have provided insights. Because of the axiomatic focus on 
atomic individuals, the influence of society is limited to the introduction of social norms 
as exogenous constraints on rational individual behaviour, without explanation for the 
emergence of these norms or the reasons that rational individuals accept them. Indeed the 
examples of framing remain very limited.  
 
The new behavioural economics addresses a wide range of framing factors which had 
earlier been raised in the old behavioural economics literature (as we shall discuss 
below). But the goal is to conform with the traditional methodological approach. As 
Hong and Stein (2007: 126) put it: 
 
The enduring appeal of classical asset-pricing theory over the last 
several decades owes much to its success in forging a consensus around a 
foundational modelling platform. This platform consists of a core set of 
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assumptions that have been widely-accepted by researchers working in the 
field as reasonable first-order descriptions of investor behaviour, and that 
– just as importantly – lend themselves to elegant, powerful, and tractable 
theorizing. 
 If behavioural finance is ever to approach the stature of classical 
asset pricing, it will have to move beyond a large collection of empirical 
facts and competing one-off models, and ultimately reach a similar sort of 
consensus. 
 
Indeed it could be argued that the approach to framing analysis of financial markets has 
therefore not fundamentally changed, and has determined how the economics literature 
has developed this new importing of ideas from psychology. Thus, for example, efforts 
are made to explain diversity of framing as differences in Bayesian priors due to 
information limitations (Hong and Stein 2007). As Kahneman (2003: 1469) put it, 
‘theories in behavioural economics have generally retained the basic architecture of the 
rational model, adding assumptions about cognitive limitations designed to account for 
specific anomalies’. The unit of analysis is still the individual actor, and the framing by 
the individual is still construed in terms of constraints (social norms, bounded rationality 
etc) which impede the perfect functioning of markets (Klaes, 2006), with rationality 
under perfect competition the reference point. For many the goal is the logical positivist 
one of refining the rationality axioms in order to generate theory which accords better 
with the evidence.  
 
There are tensions between the normative and the descriptive (with respect to rational 
behaviour) and between the theoretical and the empirical. But this is nothing new, and 
can be traced back at least as far as Mill. The end result has been fierce debate between 
the rational choice theorists and the new behavioural economists as to which conforms 
better to logical positivist principles. Rational choice theorists claim to generate clear 
hypotheses which are testable, using sophisticated mathematics, and which do not 
employ ad hoc reasoning. New behavioural economists argue that their theory is more 
empirically applicable, being consistent with actual choices made under experimental 
conditions, as well as explaining aggregative empirical phenomena which are anomalous 
in relation to classical asset-pricing models (Brav, Heaton and Rosenberg, 2004). 
 
While experiments are the primary source of evidence on framing among market users in 
the new behavioural economics, old behavioural economics aims to understand market 
framing through case studies, and has always drawn on other disciplines, notably 
psychology and sociology. Rather than the benchmark of full information, this approach 
focuses on the difficulties faced in practice in building knowledge appropriate for 
decision-making, and thus regards the scope for different framing as the norm (rather 
than a sign of irrationality). In order to interpret information and make financial decisions 
in a complex financial environment, and under uncertainty about the future, businesses 
and households need to apply some framing. The core method of case studies is designed 
to promote understanding of the way in which economic actors frame problems and 
derive strategies to deal with them. This represents an attempt to understand framing in 
real contexts, where separability (eg along disciplinary lines) is limited. This contrasts 
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with the abstract separability involved in the gathering of experimental evidence. (It is 
not the only possible approach to identifying framing in the economy; discourse analysis 
is an alternative method.) 
 
As Earl (2005: 1) puts it, old behavioural economics ‘sees everyday life as a process in 
which humans with limited cognitive capacity try to cope with both information overload 
and the absence of relevant information and knowledge by evolving targets for what 
seems feasible and systems of rules for trying to find ways for meeting these targets’. 
Cognition is not limited by the kind of rationality which is a core element of mainstream 
framing. Nor is limited information understood in terms of the benchmark of full 
information (as in the SEU approach). Rather it is understood as the normal condition of 
open-system knowledge in an open-system environment, where framing is an essential 
feature of knowledge in order to make it manageable as a basis for action. 
 
A key figure within this approach is Herbert Simon (1982), who explored the nature and 
implications of cognitive limitations within his theory of bounded rationality (see Sent, 
2004). While the new behavioural economics draws on the concept of bounded 
rationality, we have seen that the methodological framing comes from mainstream 
economics, with perfect rationality and full information providing the benchmark. Within 
mainstream economics, Simon’s contribution is understood as introducing a cognitive 
constraint on full information. Old behavioural economics rather focuses on the strategies 
by which individuals and businesses cope with both too much and too little information, 
and how decisions therefore are framed. From this follows a different framing of 
behaviour as satisficing rather than optimising. The emphasis is on understanding 
framing by businesses and households as being context-dependent manifestations of 
some general framings (bounded rationality, satisficing etc). This contrasts with the new 
behavioural economics focus on framing by agents in terms of deviations from the 
framing of abstract rational economic man. 
 
Earl (1990) provides a full account of how old behavioural economics may be developed 
with respect to financial systems. More recently, he provides an example of the 
application of old behavioural economics to finance, when he considers financial 
regulation (Earl, 2005). This analysis addresses household financial behaviour, where 
there is poor understanding of financial deals and therefore the need for regulatory 
protection. It also addresses the behaviour of financial institutions where rules of thumb 
are employed for credit risk assessment in the absence of the basis for reliable numerical 
estimation of risk, and the type of regulation which would therefore be appropriate.  
 
 
The Policy Maker’s Frame 
The goal of the policy-maker in building up knowledge of the financial sector is not 
necessarily the same as the academic economist, although policy-makers draw 
significantly on academic expertise. Policy-makers are required to act, regardless of the 
status of their knowledge, so that the emphasis has been on prediction of the state of 
financial markets, and of the effects of policy action. There is inevitably also more of a 
focus on the process by which policy is put into practice, and whether and how that 
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process affects the outcome. For national monetary authorities, this is particularly 
relevant to the effect on expectations, and thus requires a focus on cognition, learning and 
social norms.  
 
For international organisations, the nature of action is different. For the BIS, action 
consists of negotiated guidelines on such matters as capital adequacy ratios, requiring a 
consensus as to the analysis of a problem (the need to place limits on portfolio expansion 
in international assets according to the risk profile of individual financial institutions), 
and what is regarded as an appropriate solution which will be adhered to without formal 
regulation. Here the ‘facts’ are open to more contestation, notably the measurement of 
risk. But in fact a major driver of the development of the modelling of quantifiable risk 
has come out of this process. 
 
For the IMF, policy action too requires an analysis of the international financial situation 
on the one hand, and the circumstances facing individual borrowers from the Fund on the 
other. The requirements of international diplomacy, that all member governments be 
treated equally, supports the application of a common analysis to all economies (such as 
the Domestic Credit Expansion analysis of the 1980s). The mainstream economic 
approach of aiming for universal theory, to be tested against objective facts, fits this 
requirement well. Similarly, the Washington Consensus design of structural adjustment 
packages applied a common analytical approach to resolving the balance of payments 
difficulties of borrower nations. In particular these packages included financial market 
liberalisation, designed to increase the efficiency of financial markets.     
 
The engagement of borrowing governments with Washington institutions, and market 
knowledge about such engagement, introduces a significant element of performativity. As 
Gay (2007) explores, governments subjected to IMF conditionality adjust their own 
analysis and behaviour to achieve their own goals, given the constraints of the IMF 
conditions. Their own framing must incorporate the framing in Washington in order to 
engage with the IMF. Not only is there pressure to treat data series as ‘facts’, but the 
analysis itself may become accepted as ‘fact’ (Basu 2003). This phenomenon extends 
also to international capital markets. In the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, capital markets 
turned to the IMF for information about developing country borrowers, accepting their 
analysis effectively as fact. Now the IMF is extending this role to advising on inflation 
targeting as if it were an uncontested superior approach to domestic monetary policy, and 
many transition economies in particular have accepted this analysis for their rhetoric, if 
not their actual practice (see Gabor 2007). This accords with Cammack’s (2004) 
discussion of the World Bank as evolving into a Knowledge Bank, whose aim is to 
promote the development, through social transformation, of behaviour and institutions for 
a market economy. 
 
Policy-making at the national level covers a range of activities, including the regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions, monetary policy and management of the national 
debt. Increasingly these functions have become institutionally separated; indeed such 
separation has been a condition for participation in European Monetary Union. So each 
authority builds knowledge relevant to its own area of responsibility, which then provides 
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the relevant frame. These institutional arrangements then become significant where 
interdependencies emerge (as in the current financial turmoil) and communication is 
required across different frames of reference. However we will focus here on monetary 
policy as if it were an isolated activity which can function within its own framing. 
 
The focus of policy-making on activist monetary policy dates from the late 1970s with 
the emergence of global monetarism as a means of addressing inflation. This approach 
rested on an empirical relationship between monetary aggregates and the price level, such 
that anti-inflationary policy should be directed at controlling the money supply and 
thereby aggregate demand. Large macroeconomic models (built in the logical positivist 
tradition) were then employed to predict trends in aggregate demand and the required rate 
of growth in the money supply to produce the required rate of inflation. But the academic 
framing of this approach to policy required a specification of variables as endogenous or 
exogenous, and had made the money supply exogenous. This framing however proved 
inadequate, as it became apparent that the money supply could not be directly controlled, 
and policy shifted to the interest rate as the instrument rather than the money supply. For 
many academic models however, the money supply remains exogenous for reasons of 
internal coherence (and indeed with the mainstream approach to framing financial 
markets, the two can indeed be treated as interchangeable), driving a wedge between 
academic and policy framing (Dow, 1997).  
 
More generally, the failure of the models to predict well reduced their usefulness and 
policy-makers started to discuss publicly how better to frame their policy-making. The 
Bank of England (1999) in particular has explored the implications of the uncertainty 
surrounding their knowledge of the economy and the likely effects of policy actions. The 
Bank has advocated a pluralist approach in the sense of drawing on a range of models 
rather than one core model alone, and the importance of supplementing model-based 
knowledge with judgement. Similar discussions within the US Fed and the ECB have 
encouraged an exploration of model uncertainty (uncertainty as to which is the best 
model to use) in the academic literature (see for example Hansen and Sargent, 2004). But 
the framing of model uncertainty in the academic literature reflects the presumption that 
there is one best model of the economy waiting to be identified, and that error in 
identifying it can be captured in a probability distribution. This way of handling 
uncertainty is required by the logical positivist approach, which encourages the 
formulation of a mathematical model suitable for empirical testing (although in practice 
the testing is by simulation, which involves representing facts in accordance with the 
frame of the model) (Dow, 2004). 
 
This literature continues to represent expectations in the economy as conforming to the 
rational expectations hypothesis (something required by internal coherence within a 
logical positivist framework; see Sent, 1998). Central banks increasingly see influencing 
expectations as a key tool of monetary policy. This can be seen as consistent with rational 
expectations, ensuring that the public form expectations on the same basis as the central 
bank. Indeed this framing of central bank communication follows the academic literature, 
with its focus on the framing of the economy in terms of one best model (Walsh, 2007; 
Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli, 2007). But the awareness of variety of opinion among 
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policy-makers, the judgement involved in policy-making and the range of uncertainties 
facing the central bank makes central banks very sensitive to the way in which they 
communicate. This implies that there is an awareness that the formation of expectations 
does not conform in practice to the frame of rational individual choice on the basis of a 
given set of facts. Even if there were a given set of facts to communicate, there is clearly 
awareness of signal uncertainty (Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli, 2007) or what Walsh 
(2007) calls ‘communicating uncertainty’. Yet Walsh, like others in the mainstream 
literature, conveys a sense of monetary policy framing and theoretical framing 
converging.  
 
Framing issues are central to communication. In judging how the public interpret their 
communications, the central bank needs some understanding of the framing of finance by 
the different groups. In communicating monetary policy, the central bank is 
simultaneously addressing a range of constituencies, each of which may frame finance 
differently. Thus for example, in communicating to an audience attuned to the framing of 
mainstream theory, it is appropriate to refer to ‘the interest rate’ in the abstract. But for 
financial markets and in particular for individual businesses and households, there is a 
complex structure of rates with variable relationships with the policy rate. So some signal 
uncertainty may arise simply from confusion between framings. But within the 
mainstream the different ways of communicating refer to a common monetary-policy-
theoretic frame.     
 
While media headlines may be addressed to the household and business sectors, the detail 
of policy announcements is addressed primarily to players in financial markets (arguably 
the sector with the most power over financial outcomes for households and non-financial 
business). Thus for example, when the Bank of England refers to market expectations of 
inflation, the data are derived from the inflation expectation implicit in the pricing of 
financial assets. Communications in turn generally involve the technical language 
employed by market players. We turn now to consider how financial markets are framed 
by those who are active in these markets. 
 
Inputs from Sociology and Rhetoric Studies 
While the new behavioural economics does not explore framing itself, we can look to 
sociology for assistance. The conventional theoretical account of market players in 
economics is framed by the rationality axioms, and market players do employ models 
which presume this basis for behaviour. One of the key features of this logical positivist 
approach to building knowledge within financial markets is to price assets in terms of 
risk, based on historical data. This presumes that the future distribution of an asset price 
is knowable, continuing patterns derived from past experience, ie that the basis for value 
is an ergodic process (Davidson 1982-83). The key to asset-pricing is estimation of risk, 
but there is no accommodation in these models for uncertainty as unquantifiable risk. The 
implication is that it is simply a matter of skill to identify correct pricing and then to 
identify deviations which would allow profits from arbitrage. The highest profits go to 
the companies with the greatest skill, and we have seen the increasing reliance on 
‘quants’ in financial markets as a way of making profits in derivatives markets. Since 
there are differences in profitability within the financial sector, the situation does not 
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conform to the strong rational expectations hypothesis, whereby all players share the 
same (correct) model. But the logical implication of framing the situation in this way is 
that learning will erode profits, and it is only through innovation in new products and 
random shocks, both of which require new learning, that profits can still be made. 
 
But sociologists who have explored the actual practices within financial markets (eg 
using interview evidence) cast doubt on this way of understanding framing within 
financial markets, and indeed see quantitative models only as partial contributors to 
framing. Thus MacKenzie (2005) demonstrates in the context of LTCM that judgement 
(which cannot be formalised) is required in addition to modelling. This explains why 
LTCM could continue for a long time to make much higher profits than others who were 
copying their models. This finding is also consistent with the view now expressed by 
central banks that they require to exercise (non-formalisable) judgement to supplement 
modelling. So the important question, in shifting the framing to focus on judgement, is 
how judgement is framed and formed. 
 
The greatest illumination of this question comes again from the economic sociology 
literature, which focuses on the process of judgement formation within the society of 
market traders. Traditionally, even within sociology, market behaviour was seen as 
‘economistic’ (ie based on rational individual behaviour), and contrasted with non-market 
behaviour, which was the province of sociology. For Pareto, the distinction was between 
‘logical’ and ‘non-logical’ behaviour, respectively (Klaes, 2006). But efforts are 
increasingly being made to re-embed markets as ideas and practices of social co-
ordination within their political, social and cultural contexts (Bevir and Trentmann, 
2007). 
 
Information itself, or ‘the facts’, is seen in sociology as including social interactions as 
well as the more conventional forms, notably prices. But even prices are understood in 
social terms rather than in the abstract (as in conventional economics). Preda (2007) 
classifies the sociological analysis of financial markets, and in particular how market 
information is conceptualised, as falling within three, complementary, categories. In 
sociology, as in economics, there is a range of methodological approaches associated 
with different framings. First, there is the ‘new economic sociology’ study of markets as 
social networks and as groups, analysed in terms of formal models. The argument is that 
how these networks shape, not only ‘the dynamics of financial transactions’, but also 
‘how they influence price, volume and volatility’ (Preda, 2007: 508). Second, there is the 
‘neo-institutionalism’ which explores the institutions within which networks operate, and 
their political dimension. This approach draws more on quantitative and qualitative 
evidence, but focuses more on power relations than the processes by which knowledge is 
produced.  
 
Power relations are more the province of the third, social studies, approach, which rests 
on detailed field information rather than formal modeling or theory testing. One of the 
outcomes of this approach is the argument that technology is not neutral with respect 
either to the understanding of ‘facts’ or to the organisation of markets. Financial 
cognition is seen as ‘a set of complex, interlocked processes, ranging from perception and 
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memorization to classification and the calculation of trading operations, and implying not 
isolated individuals, but group work, actors as well as technologies’ (Preda, 2007: 521). 
A key concept (developed in this context by MacKenzie, 2006) is performativity – the 
effect of the framing of financial markets in the academic literature on the actual 
behaviour of financial markets. MacKenzie (2005) demonstrates how competitors of 
LTCM copied their market strategy, such that there were no counterparties with whom to 
trade when the financial crisis broke. (This crisis, incidentally, occurred because framing 
risk as historical variance proved inadequate when there were structural shifts in markets, 
ie the markets were non-ergodic.)  
 
The rhetoric approach to economics has emphasised the use of language in persuasion 
more generally. Indeed this approach has been extended to a framing of market processes 
themselves as an as an exercise in ‘conversation’ (McCloskey, 2007). McCloskey 
demonstrates that a high proportion (around a quarter) of all economic activity involves 
persuasion. Within the financial sector this includes the work of financial advisors, and 
the advertising of financial instruments. But more fundamentally it includes the 
communication between market players which encourages the buying of one class of 
asset, the selling of another, a lack of confidence in predictions and so on. It also includes 
the cementing of social conventions (to accept this asset in payment but not that) and the 
spreading of the idea to make a run on a bank, for example. The central bank is 
continually engaged in conversation with market players to encourage them to hold a 
particular view. And governments engage in conversation with international 
organisations. New frames are adopted as a result of successful persuasion. Clearly a core 
element of persuasion is power. 
 
 
Framing, Methodology and The Contribution of Other Disciplines 
We have seen in the previous discussion that financial markets are framed differently by 
different groups, but the greatest difference arguably is between the mainstream 
theoretical approach and the experience in the economy. The importation of ideas, and 
new types of evidence, from other disciplines, notably psychology, have enriched the 
theoretical account. And they have done so by suggesting that actual framing in the 
economy is different from what is conventionally assumed by the abstract conception of 
rational economic man. They do so by introducing alternative ways of framing this 
framing in the economy. But the extent to which these new avenues can be pursued has 
been constrained where there is insistence on retaining rational economic man as the 
benchmark, and formal equilibrium models as the method. Much of what has traditionally 
been understood to be non-economic remains outside the discussion, while real 
experience seems to involve a fundamental influence of the ‘non-economic’ on market 
behaviour.  
 
The choice as to how to frame theory is a methodological question. There is no absolute 
standard by which to judge any methodology; each has its benefits and costs relative to 
the others. But critical realists (notably Lawson 1997, 2003) argue that the benefits of 
designing the theoretical frame to reflect the nature of the subject matter outweigh any 
costs in terms of lack of elegance, or indeed of definitive predictions. Of course how the 
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nature of the subject matter is understood is itself a matter of framing. Critical realists 
share with others (such as old behavioural economists) the view that the economy is an 
open system, in the sense that it does not satisfy the conditions for internal closure (no 
evolution in internal relations between elements of the system) or external closure (no 
evolution in the designation of endogenous and exogenous variables) (see Chick and 
Dow, 2005, for a more general set of conditions for closed and open systems). It is 
argued that an open social system is best understood by an open system of knowledge. 
Further it is argued that these conditions mean that knowledge in the economy conforms 
to an open system. While some of that system may be captured by formal mathematical 
techniques, other methods can add further knowledge. Also, since much of the forces for 
change in social relations and in external forces are the traditional subject matter of other 
disciplines, it is natural to anticipate knowledge benefiting from interdisciplinary 
exchange. 
 
We have attempted to show here a contrast between the way in which contributions from 
other disciplines to our understanding of framing in financial markets results in very 
different theoretical framing. It depends on whether incorporating this broader view of 
framing in the economy is seen as a modification of mainstream theory (applied as it 
were from the ‘top down’ from theory to experience) on the one hand, or as input to the 
framing of real experience which influences the nature of open systems theorising by 
economists (from the ‘bottom up’) on the other. Nevertheless, any ‘bottom up’ approach, 
which takes the framing in the economy seriously, must itself employ some framing or 
other. Thus old behavioural economics has thrown up the framing concept of satisficing, 
for example.  
 
Input from psychology and sociology suggests that framing is the manifestation of 
discourses which differ for good reason (in the broadest sense of the term). If knowledge 
is framed by political power, by social convention, by institutional arrangements, and by 
sentiment, and conditioned by uncertainty resulting from the nature of social systems, and 
by cognitive limitations, then we are far removed from a world of ‘facts’. Inevitably there 
will be different framings. Social interactions, and particularly power relations, mean that 
there will be reflexivity – one group’s framing will impact on the framing of other 
groups. Indeed there is likely to be performativity – one group’s framing altering the 
subject of the framing. 
 
For these factors to be analysed satisfactorily, economic analysis of financial markets 
needs to be conducted within an open system of knowledge; this is a prerequisite for 
drawing on the full contribution which other disciplines can make – not just those 
contributions which can be expressed within a closed-system mainstream approach. It has 
been argued elsewhere (Dow and Dow, 2006; Shin, 2006; Gay, 2007) that the key is to 
use an approach which allows for some generalisations on the one hand, but respects 
particularity on the other. This has particular relevance for the approach taken by 
international organisations. De la Torre et al (2007) provide a detailed explanation of the 
failure of Washington Consensus financial liberalisation policies, and conclude with a 
call for ‘modesty’ (an interesting counter, from World Bank staff to the monist 
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Knowledge Bank approach characterised by Cammack, 2004). The source of the struggle 
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